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Abstract
The political theorist William Galston argues that the liberal political tradition
contains two distinct strands of philosophical thought. One emphasizes the principle of
autonomy, while the other stresses the principle of diversity. These principles, according to
Galston, are in tension with each other and as guiding criterions lead to quite different
public policies. Autonomy-centered liberalism seeks to promote autonomy or “individual
self-direction”; it reflects a “commitment to sustained rational examination of self, others,
and social practices.” As such, autonomy-centered liberals are generally suspicious of
religious belief and seek to confine it to the private sphere. Diversity-centered liberalism,
on the other hand, seeks to maximize the public space (legally, institutionally, and
culturally) in which different individuals and groups can live out their differences, limited
only by the demands of liberal social unity.
Although Galston does not focus on constitutional law, his explanation of the
different conceptions of the liberal political tradition and the place of religion in it raises the
question of the extent to which the U.S. Supreme Court’s establishment clause jurisprudence
can be explained by the autonomy-diversity dichotomy he has drawn. That is, just as
autonomy-centered liberalism seeks to confine religion to the private sphere, so too has
much of the Supreme Court’s establishment clause jurisprudence. The question arises then
as to whether the Supreme Court’s effort to limit the public role of religion has been driven
by an understanding of the liberal political tradition that emphasizes the principle of
autonomy, or by something else? Similarly, one wonders if the Supreme Court’s movement
over the last two decades toward greater tolerance of religion in public life is rooted in an
understanding of the liberal political tradition that stresses the protection of diversity over
the promotion of autonomy.
The aim of this study is to examine the Supreme Court’s establishment clause
jurisprudence against the backdrop of Galston’s writings to see if we can discern in the
Court’s treatment of religion any affinities with the two concepts of liberalism Galston
describes. To this end, I explore the cases in which the Court has wrestled with the
degree to which public funds can be used to support the education of children enrolled in
religious schools and the cases in which it has used the establishment clause to remove all
official religious practices and symbols from public schooling. I focus on the issue of
religion and schooling because this is where the Court’s modern establishment clause
jurisprudence began and, because it is the context in which a sizeable majority of
establishment clause cases have been decided, it is the milieu in which the Court’s
establishment clause jurisprudence has largely been fashioned. As Galston points out,
moreover, the issue of education is one in which the conflict between autonomy and
diversity is especially pronounced. To anticipate my conclusions, I suggest that there are
affinities between autonomy-centered liberalism and the jurisprudence that seeks to
secularize the public sphere, on the one hand, and between diversity-centered liberalism
and the jurisprudence that seeks not to privatize religion but to ensure only that
government does not directly support religion, on the other hand. The similarities in both
cases are not so strong or robust, however, as to indicate a straightforward connection
between liberal political philosophy and the Court’s establishment clause jurisprudence.
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The political theorist William Galston argues that the liberal political tradition
contains two conflicting strands of philosophical thought1 One emphasizes the principle
of autonomy, while the other stresses the principle of diversity. These principles, Galston
argues, are in tension with each other and as guiding criterions lead to quite different
public policies. Autonomy-centered liberalism seeks to promote autonomy or “individual
self-direction”; it reflects a “commitment to sustained rational examination of self, others,
and social practices.”2 As such, autonomy-centered liberals are generally suspicious of
religious belief and seek to confine it to the private sphere. Diversity-centered liberalism,
on the other hand, seeks to maximize the public space (legally, institutionally, and
culturally) in which different individuals and groups can live out their differences, limited
only by the demands of liberal social unity. Many cultural/political disputes today,
Galston contends, can be understood as a conflict between the principles of autonomy
and diversity.
Although Galston does not focus on constitutional law, his explanation of the
different conceptions of the liberal political tradition and the place of religion in it raises
the question of the extent to which the U.S. Supreme Court’s establishment clause
jurisprudence can be explained by the autonomy-diversity dichotomy he has drawn. That
is, just as autonomy-centered liberalism seeks to confine religion to the private sphere, so
too has much of the Supreme Court’s establishment clause jurisprudence.3 The question
arises then as to whether the Supreme Court’s effort to limit the public role of religion
1

William A. Galston, Liberal Pluralism 15-27 (2002). See also Galston, Two Concepts of Liberalism,
Ethics 105: 516-534 (1995).
2
Galston, Liberal Pluralism, supra note 1, at 21.
3
See, e.g., Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602 (1971), where Chief Justice Burger, writing for the Court in a
ruling declaring unconstitutional New Jersey and Pennsylvania laws supplementing the salaries of teachers
teaching secular subjects in parochial schools, declared that the “[c]onstitution decrees that religion must be
a private matter for the individual, the family, and the institutions of private choice.” I examine the
privatization thesis at length in Kevin Pybas, Does the Establishment Clause Require Religion to be
Confined to the Private Sphere?, Valparaiso University Law Review (forthcoming, Fall 2005).
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has been driven by an understanding of the liberal political tradition that emphasizes the
principle of autonomy, or by something else? Similarly, one wonders if the Supreme
Court’s movement over the last two decades toward greater tolerance of religion in public
life4 is rooted in an understanding of the liberal political tradition that stresses the
protection of diversity over the promotion of autonomy. Our curiosity about the
possibility that much of the Supreme Court’s establishment clause jurisprudence is itself
a debate about the meaning of the liberal political tradition—whether, per Galston, it is
best understood as autonomy-centered or diversity-centered—is heightened when we
observe that the plain language of the establishment clause and the history of the First
Amendment provide few, if any, clear-cut answers to contemporary questions of religionstate relations. Noting this, Justice Byron White once remarked that
In the end, the courts have fashioned answers to these questions as best
they can, the language of the Constitution and its history having left them
a wide range of choices among many alternatives. But decision has been
unavoidable; and, in choosing, the courts necessarily have carved out what
they deemed to be the most desirable national policy governing various
aspects of church-state relationships.5

4

See Zobrest v. Catalina Foothills School District, 509 U.S. 1 (1993) (allowing a state-employed signlanguage interpreter to assist a deaf student enrolled in a Roman Catholic high school); Rosenberger v.
Rector and Visitors of University of Virginia, 515 U.S. 819 (1995) (finding that a public university does
not violate the establishment clause when it makes student activity funds available to various student
groups, including a student-run religious organization, on the basis of neutral criteria); Agostini v. Felton,
521 U.S. 203 (1997) (allowing state-employed teachers to offer instruction in remedial and enrichment
courses in parochial schools) (overruling Grand Rapids School District v. Ball, 473 U.S. 373 (1985), and
Aguilar v. Felton, 473 U.S. 402 (1985)); Mitchell v. Helms, 530 U.S. 793 (2000) (upholding a federal law
providing instructional materials such as library books, media materials, and computers to religious
schools) (overruling parts of Meek v. Pittenger, 421 U.S. 349 (1975), and Wolman v. Walter, 433 U. S.
229 (1977)); and Zelman v. Simmons-Harris, 536 U.S. 639 (2002) (upholding an Ohio law providing
tuition assistance to students enrolled in religious schools). See also Mueller v. Allen, 463 U.S. 388 (1983)
(upholding the constitutionality of a Minnesota law allowing parents to take a tax deduction for school
expenses, irrespective of whether their children attended public or private schools, including parochial
schools); and Witters v. Washington Department of Services for the Blind, 474 U.S. 481 (1986) (finding no
constitutional violation in allowing a college student to use neutrally available state vocational
rehabilitation assistance funds at a Christian college).
5
Committee for Public Education & Religious Liberty v. Nyquist, 413 U.S. 756, 820 (1973) (White, J.,
dissenting).

4

.

If neither the language of the First Amendment nor the history of its ratification makes
necessary the specific conclusions the Supreme Court has reached in its many
establishment clause decisions, what accounts for the ways in which the Court has
resolved these cases? Perhaps it is the case that Supreme Court’s articulation of what it
has “deemed to be the most desirable national policy governing” religion in public life is
driven by broader moral and philosophical considerations, that is, by its understanding of
the liberal political tradition and the place of religion in it. Examining the Court’s
establishment clause cases in light of the philosophical dichotomy drawn by Galston may
thus illuminate this area of the law in a waythatscholarship emphasizing either

historical

arguments about the meaning of the First Amendment or doctrinal developments does
not.
The aim of this study then is to examine the Supreme Court’s establishment
clause jurisprudence against the backdrop of Galston’s writings to see if we can discern
in the Court’s treatment of religion any affinities with the two concepts of liberalism
Galston describes. I shall proceed, first, in Part I, by more fully examining Galston’s
writings. I shall then explore in Part II the cases in which the Court has wrestled with the
degree to which public funds can be used to support the education of children enrolled in
religious schools and the cases in which it has used the establishment clause to remove all
official religious practices and symbols from public schooling. I focus on the issue of
religion and schooling because this is where the Court’s modern establishment clause
jurisprudence began6 and, because it is the context in which a sizeable majority of
establishment clause cases have been decided, it is the milieu in which the Court’s
establishment clause jurisprudence has largely been fashioned. As Galston points out,
6

See Everson v. Board of Education, 330 U.S. 1 (1947).
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moreover, the issue of education is one in which the conflict between autonomy and
diversity is especially pronounced. Part III attempts to link the competing interpretations
of the liberal political tradition with competing interpretations of the establishment clause
as they are reflected in the religion and schooling cases. I state my conclusions in Part IV
of the paper. To anticipate my conclusions, I suggest that there are affinities between
autonomy-centered liberalism and the jurisprudence that seeks to secularize the public
sphere, on the one hand, and between diversity-centered liberalism and the jurisprudence
that seeks not to privatize religion but to ensure only that government does not directly
support religion, on the other hand. The similarities in both cases are not so strong or
robust, however, as to indicate a straightforward connection between liberal political
philosophy and the Court’s establishment clause jurisprudence.
Before proceeding, I wish to note that in examining the cases my aim is not to
give an exhaustive account of the justices’ arguments and counterarguments or to argue
that one side or the other gets it right (or wrong) in their treatment of precedent and
constitutional history. Rather my focus is on those aspects of the respective opinions that
are helpful in understanding and illustrating the different philosophical assumptions—the
different understandings of liberalism—that seem to underlie them. I must note, too, that
a striking feature of much of the Court’s establishment clause jurisprudence is the
absence of any meaningful moral or philosophical reflection about the place of religion in
a free society. In seeking to comprehend the Court’s understanding of liberalism in these
cases, then, one must attempt to draw out from cursory historical analyses and generally
conclusory statements about the meaning of the establishment clause the moral and
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philosophical assumptions on which the decisions seem to rest. Finally, my attitude, if
you will, in this paper is speculative and suggestive rather than certain and conclusory.

I. Galston on Two Concepts of Liberalism
According to Galston, within the broad liberal political tradition the principles of
autonomy and diversity are in tension with each other. By autonomy, Galston means
“individual self-direction in at least one of many senses explored by John Locke,
Immanual Kant, John Stuart Mill, and Americans writing in an Emersonian vein. Liberal
autonomy is frequently linked with the commitment to sustained rational examination of
self, others, and social practices."7 Diversity, on the other hand, is defined as "legitimate
differences among individuals and groups over such matters as the nature of the good
life, sources of moral authority, reason versus faith, and the like."8 In Galston's view,
many liberals, past and present, mistakenly assume that diversity and autonomy "fit
together and complement one another: The exercise of autonomy yields diversity, while
the fact of diversity protects and nourishes autonomy."9 In practice, however, the
principles rarely harmonize: "[I]n currently disputed areas such as education, rights of
association, and the free exercise of religion . . . they point in quite different

7

Galston, Liberal Pluralism, supra note 1, at 21.
Id. While Galston defines diversity as "differences among individuals and groups," his primary concern,
as will become clear below, is with group diversity. If Galston were to understand diversity primarily in
terms of cultivating individual difference, he would be drawn more than he intends in the direction of
autonomy, but in fact he is a critic of autonomy as an ideal. We should note also that when Galston uses
the words "individual" or "individualism," he does not attach to them the Millian notion of selfdevelopment or the Kantian idea self-perfection, and he does not use the term pejoratively, in the manner of
Tocqueville. Instead, individualism "corresponds [with] the liberal virtue of independence—the disposition
to care for, and take responsibility for, oneself and to avoid becoming needlessly dependent on others."
William A. Galston, Liberal Purposes: Goods, Virtues, and Diversity in the Liberal State 222 (1991).
9
Galston, Liberal Pluralism, supra note 1, at 21.
8
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directions."10 Disputesin education and with regard to religion as well as in other areas
are thus best understood "as a conflict between these two principles." Many cultural and
political conflicts derive from "the decision to throw state power behind the promotion of
individual autonomy," and this "can undermine individuals and groups that do not and
cannot organize their affairs in accordance with that principle without undermining the
deepest sources of their identity."11 The promotion of autonomy, moreover, often leads
liberal societies to act "in ways that reduce diversity."12
Liberal societies need not promote autonomy, however, to retain their liberal
character. Indeed,
properly understood, liberalism is about the protection of legitimate diversity.
A liberal state need not and should not take sides on such issues as purity
versus mixture [of cultures] or reason versus tradition. To place an ideal of
autonomous choice . . . at the core of liberalism is in fact to narrow the range
of possibilities available within liberal societies. In the guise of protecting
the capacity for diversity, the autonomy principle in fact represents a kind of
uniformity that exerts pressure on ways of life that do not embrace
autonomy. . . . '[T]he Kantian and Millian conceptions of liberalism (which
rest on autonomy and individuality as specifications of the good life) are not
adequate solutions to the political problems of reasonable disagreements
about the good life. They have themselves simply become another part of the
problem.'13
The unspoken premise here, I believe, is that diversity arises out of different communities
and is not reducible to individual differences. In contrast to Mill’s critique of custom and
tradition and the power they hold over individual choice, to say nothing of his argument that
individuals are not truly free unless they have freely chosen their way of life, Galston
suggests that individuality makes sense only in the context of community. Before

10

Galston, Liberal Pluralism, supra note 1, at 21.
Galston, Liberal Pluralism, supra note 1, at 21.
12
Galston, Two Concepts of Liberalism, supra note 1, at 522.
13
Galston, Liberal Pluralism, supra note 1, at 23 (quoting Charles Larmore, Political Liberalism, Political
Theory 18: 345 (1990)).
11

8

.

individuals are adults capable of choosing a way of life for themselves, they are children in
need of nurturing and development. Done well, rearing children requires vibrant, supportive
communities, including "families, neighborhoods, schools, voluntary associations, and
religious institutions."14 Public policies promoting self-development or self-perfection
undermine diversity by making more difficult the existence of subcommunities not
organized around those principles. The push to make individuality or autonomy the
organizing principle of all of society thus undermines in the long run the conditions that
prepare children to make meaningful choices as adults.
Galston maintains that while the conflict between autonomy and diversity is
exacerbated by the rise of the modern welfare state, its roots are centuries old. On the one
hand, autonomy-centered liberalism is
linked to an historical impulse often associated with Enlightenment—
namely, liberation through reason from externally imposed authority.
Within this context, reason is understood as the prime source of authority;
the examined life is understood as superior to reliance on tradition or faith;
preference is to be given to self-direction over external determination; and
appropriate relationships to conceptions of good or of value, and
especially conceptions that constitute groups, are held to originate only
through acts of conscious individual reflection on and commitment to such
conceptions.15
On the other hand, diversity-centered liberalism is connected to what Galston calls the
"post-Reformation Project—that is, to the effort to deal with the political consequences of
religious differences in the wake of divisions within Christendom." The effort to deal with
the fractionation of Christendom gave rise, in turn, to various political strategies. The
strategy that finally carried the day, the one that
proved most decisive for the development of liberalism, was that of
accepting and managing diversity through mutual toleration. Within a
framework of civic unity, a plurality of religions could be allowed to
14

Galston, A Public Philosophy for the 21st Century, The Responsive Community 8 (1998): 18, 21.
Galston, Liberal Pluralism, supra note 1, at 24. By and large, this is what Tocqueville describes as "the
precepts of Descartes." Alexis de Tocqueville, Democracy in America 429-33 (J.P. Mayer ed. & George
Lawrence trans., HarperPerennial 1966) (1840).
15
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coexist. It was in fact that religious diversity that undergirds, and
eventually sets in motion the development of, our wider conception of
individual and cultural difference. And thus, any reasonable
understanding of diversity will have to include (though in modern
circumstances cannot be restricted to) religious commitments.16
The problem then with invoking autonomy as the polestar of public life in a diverse
society is that doing so places the coercive powers of the state behind a partisan
conception of the good life; the state “takes sides in the ongoing struggle between reason
and faith, reflection and tradition. Autonomy-based arguments are bound to marginalize
those individuals and groups who cannot conscientiously embrace the Enlightenment
impulse.”17
Rightly understood, liberalism is concerned with diversity, not autonomy or
individuality. This is not to say that autonomy has no place in liberalism. Galston
acknowledge that it does, but insists that it is only a feature of liberalism and not the
whole. Diversity-centered liberalism provides space for many ways of life, including
Millian and Kantian ways of life. But autonomy-centered liberalism, as Galston points
out, leaves little room for diversity, especially as regards ways of life based on faith or
tradition. Autonomy advocates, in his view, unnecessarily provoke and marginalize
many citizens of good will, especially the religious and traditionalists who, for reasons of
conscience, reject the Enlightenment impulse. In so doing, autonomy-centered liberalism
fails to take diversity, understood to encompass our deepest differences, especially our
religious differences, seriously. Galston writes: "the state-supported commitment to
autonomy tugs against specific kinds of lives that differ fundamentally, not just

16
17

Galston, Liberal Pluralism, supra note 1, at 25.
Galston, Liberal Pluralism, supra note 1, at 25-26.
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superficially, from many others and whose disappearance would reduce social
diversity."18 Only diversity-centered liberalism "gives diversity its due."
For Galston, diversity-centered liberalism finds practical expression in "the
'Diversity State'—that is, in public principles, institutions, and practices that afford
maximum feasible space for the enactment of individual and group differences,
constrained only by the requirements of liberal social unity."19 Galston’s claim is not that
the liberal state must be neutral. There are, he acknowledges, “compelling state interests
that warrant public interference with group practices.”20 These state interests fall into
four general categories: “first, solving coordination problems among legitimate activities
and adjudicating unavoidable conflicts among them; second, deterring and when
necessary punishing transgressions individuals may commit against one another; third,
safeguarding the boundaries separating legitimate from illegitimate variations among
ways of life; and finally, securing the conditions—including the cultural and civic
conditions—needed to sustain liberal pluralist institutions.”21 The ways in which

18

Galston, Two Concepts of Liberalism, supra note 1, at 521. According to Galston, the failure to take
diversity seriously is a failing not only of self-professed autonomy liberals, but also of John Rawls, who
purports, in Political Liberalism, to take as his starting point the fact that people disagree deeply and
permanently about their moral, philosophic, and religious beliefs. On Galston's account, Rawls fails to take
our differences seriously enough, especially as regards religious belief. Id. at 518-521. See also Galston,
Pluralism and Social Unity, Ethics 99: 711-726 (1989) and Liberal Purposes, supra note 8, Chapter 7.
19
Galston, Two Concepts of Liberalism, supra note 1, at 524.
20
Galston, Liberal Pluralism, supra note 1, at 23.
21
Galston, Liberal Pluralism, supra note 1, at 125. Among the civic conditions necessary to sustain the
Diversity State, or what Galston also calls the liberal pluralist regime, is a tolerant citizenry and a scheme
of civic education that teaches tolerance along with other liberal virtues. As regards tolerance, Galston
expressly rejects the argument made by autonomy liberals that genuine toleration requires intense critical
reflection on all ways of life, especially as regards inherited beliefs. The Diversity State must "evince[] a
strong system of tolerance." What Galston means here is not a relativistic "wishy-washiness" on moral
issues, but "the principled refusal to use coercive state instruments to impose one's views on others, and
therefore a commitment to moral competition through recruitment and persuasion alone." Id. at 126.
Moreover, he does not regard unreflective commitment to one's way of life as necessarily inconsistent with
tolerance. As he writes, “[c]ivic tolerance of deep differences is perfectly compatible with unswerving
belief in the correctness of one’s own way of life.” Galston, Liberal Purposes, supra note 8, at 253. In
short, the toleration a liberal polity requires is not skepticism about the correctness of one’s way of life, but
a commitment not to use state power to impose one's way of life on another.
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individuals and groups may be restricted represent the demands of social unity. Claims
of unimpeded liberty to live out differences must give way to the public institutions that
secure the “space within which individuals and groups may lead their lives in accordance
with their diverse understandings of what gives life meaning and value.”22
The picture Galston draws of the conflict between autonomy-centered liberalism
and diversity-centered liberalism can be brought into greater relief by examining two
concrete examples of the conflict. As Galston argues, the conflict between the principles
of autonomy and diversity is especially pronounced in the areas of “education, rights of
association, and the free exercise of religion.”23 Examples of educational disputes that
Galston notes, which also escalated into free exercise of religion claims, include those
litigated in Wisconsin v. Yoder24 and Mozert v. Hawkins County Board of Education.25
The issue in Yoder was whether Old Order Amish fourteen- and fifteen year-old children
should be exempt, on free exercise grounds, from a compulsory education law requiring
children to attend school until the age of sixteen. The Amish parents did not object to
their children attending school until the age of fourteen but resisted the law on grounds
that no additional formal education was necessary to prepare their children for
participation in the Amish way of life and that high school would expose Amish children
to “worldly influences”26 that threatened to undermine not only the religious beliefs of
Amish teenagers but the Amish religious community itself. In ruling in favor of the
Amish, the Court accepted the State of Wisconsin’s claim that the compulsory education
law was animated by the state’s valid interest in preparing students both for effective
22

Galston, Liberal Pluralism, supra note 1, at 125.
Galston, Liberal Pluralism, supra note 1, at 21.
24
406 U.S. 205 (1972).
25
827 F.2d 1058 (6th Cir. 1987).
26
Yoder, 406 U.S. at 218.
23
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participation in the nation’s civic life and for economic self-sufficiency as adults.27 The
Court concluded, however, that the Amish system of informal, technical post-elementary
education, with its focus on developing manual labor skills, more than adequately
prepared Amish children to become productive members of Amish society and even of
the wider society itself, should they choose to leave the Amish faith.28 As for the civic
education of the Amish, the Court noted the fact that the Amish had “survived and
prospered” in this country for over 200 years “as a separate, sharply identifiable and
highly self-sufficient community[,]” which indicated “that they are capable of fulfilling
the social and political responsibilities of citizenship” without benefit of a formal high
school education.29
The issue in Mozert was whether elementary school children had a free exercise
right to opt out of a reading program that the children’s parents found to be offensive to
the families’ religious beliefs. The reading program was intended to build not only
reading skills but also to teach tolerance by exposing children to diverse viewpoints and
ways of life so that the students might learn tolerance of others, but some parents
objected that some of the stories involved denigrated their faith.30 The parents asked not
that the offending reading program be dropped but only that their children be allowed to
pursue an alternative reading curriculum.31 Some students were initially provided with
alternative readings that were satisfactory to the parents. Ultimately, however, the county
school board made the objectionable reading series mandatory for all students and
27

Yoder, 406 U.S. at 221.
Yoder, 406 U.S. at 222-225.
29
Yoder, 406 U.S. at 225.
30
Objections to the reading program included claims that it promoted “evolution and ‘secular humanism[,]’
. . . ‘futuristic supernaturalism,’ pacifism, magic and false views of death[,]” all in violation of the families’
religious beliefs. Mozert, 827 F.2d at 1062.
31
Mozert, 827 F.2d at 1060.
28
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suspended from school those children who refused these readings.32 At this point the
Mozerts and other families filed suit, claim that the mandatory policy violated their free
exercise rights. The Court of Appeals denied the families’ free exercise claim, ruling that
the reading program did not compel or coerce the children into violating their religious
beliefs. The court reasoned instead that the readers simply exposed the children to ideas,
ideas that, to be sure, their parents objected to on religious grounds. But, the court
concluded, exposure to objectionable ideas does not burden religion in a way against
which the First Amendment protects.33
These cases are expressions of the conflict between autonomy-centered liberalism
and diversity-centered liberalism in that the disputes were largely about whether the state
or public schools should be permitted to develop autonomy or critical reasoning skills in
the children at issue over the religious objections of their parents. Galston does not of
course claim that the legal arguments and the decisions themselves framed the issues in
such philosophical terms. Essentially, however, both cases involved state authorities
promoting a principle—autonomy—that in the abstract is unobjectionable but which in
each case conflicted with deeply held religious beliefs. Galston argues that the state’s
objective in each case—in Yoder to prepare teenagers to become independent, selfsufficient adults and to participate in the nation’s civic life, and in Mozert to developing a
tolerant citizenry—could be achieved without infringing upon the religious beliefs of the
objecting families. In other words, giving diversity its due means insofar as is feasible
accommodating the religious beliefs of citizens. And since the accommodation sought by
32

Id.
For a compelling account of the Mozert case itself and the larger political struggle of which it was a part,
see Stephen Bates, Battleground: One Mother’s Crusade, the Religious Right, and the Struggle for Control
of Our Classrooms (1993). I question the Mozert ruling in Kevin Pybas, Liberalism and Civic Education:
Unitary versus Pluralist Alternatives, Perspectives on Political Science 33: 18, 25-26 (2004).
33

14

.

the religious parents in both cases could have been granted without jeopardizing the
otherwise legitimate aims of public schooling, Galston thus defends the Yoder decision
and questions the outcome of Mozert. 34
In summary, autonomy-centered liberalism aims to make autonomy the guiding
principle of public life. It is thus often antagonistic toward ways of life that give priority
to values other than autonomy, such as those based on faith or tradition. Diversitycentered liberalism, on the other hand, focuses on pluralism or diversity and seeks to
maximum the space available for individuals and groups to live according to their own
best lights, constrained only by the demands of social unity. Having briefly outlined
Galston’s arguments, let us now examine various establishment clause/schooling casesto
see if they might betray any similarities to the moral and philosophical commitments of
autonomy-centered liberalism or diversity-centered liberalism.

II. Schooling and Establishment Clause Jurisprudence
From the American founding until about the middle of the last century, religion
was an integral part of the educational experience of the vast majority of children in
America. Religion was generally thought to be indispensable to civic or moral
instruction, and this instruction was regarded as a primary responsibility of the schools.
This was true even after compulsory public schools began to be established in the midnineteenth century. For the first hundred years or so of American public schooling, the
moral component of the curriculum was heavily infused with Protestant Christianity, the
religion of the majority of the population.35 Protestantism remained dominant, even as

34

Galston, Liberal Pluralism, supra note 1, Chapters 8 and 9. Also, the arguments of Galston’s Two
Concepts of Liberalism, supra note 1, are mainly framed around the issues raised in Yoder.
35
See, e.g., Charles L. Glenn, Jr., The Myth of the Common School (1987).
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the nation was growing more religiously diverse, because of the long-standing practice in
America of regarding education as properly a matter of local concern. In most localities,
the Protestant majority was able to impose its moral ideas on various religious minorities,
most notably, Roman Catholics, as well as on the irreligious. Rather than acquiescing in
moral instruction contrary to their own beliefs, Catholics, after the mid- nineteenth
century, began to establish parochial schools so that their principles could be passed on to
their children.
Despite the Protestant character of public schooling, the issue that launched the
Court’s modern establishment clause jurisprudence was one involving public aid to
parents of children enrolled in Catholic schools. In 1947, in Everson v. Board of
Education of Ewing Township,36 the Supreme Court ruled that the establishment clause of
the First Amendment was incorporated through the due process clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment and thereby made applicable to the states.37 In Everson, the Court, speaking
through Justice Hugo Black, cited Thomas Jefferson's 1802 letter to the Danbury
Connecticut Baptist Association for its contention that the First Amendment was intended
to erect "’a wall of separation between church and state.’"38 The Court interpreted
Jefferson's metaphor to mean that neither the federal government nor the states "can pass
laws which aid one religion, aid all religions, or prefer one religion over another."39

36

330 U.S. 1.
In Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296 (1940), the Court indicated that the religion clause of the First
Amendment is binding on the states, but Cantwell involved only a free-exercise claim. Left unclear by
Cantwell was whether the establishment clause was also binding on the states.
38
Everson, 330 U.S. at 16. For perhaps the best account available of Jefferson and his letter to the
Danbury, Connecticut, Baptist Association, from which the “wall of separation” metaphor is taken, see
Daniel L. Dreisbach, Thomas Jefferson and the Wall of Separation between Church and State (2002). For
an argument against the notion that the First Amendment simply restates Jefferson’s (and Madison’s) views
on church and state, see Steven D. Smith, Foreordained Failure: The Quest for a Constitutional Principle
of Religious Freedom (1995).
39
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Ironically, after interpreting the establishment clause to mean that “[n]o tax in any
amount, large or small, can be levied to support any religious activities or institutions,”40
the Court affirmed the constitutionality of a law reimbursing parents for the costs of
transporting their children to and from Catholic schools. The reimbursement program,
the Court concluded, was intended to ensure that children had safe transportation to
school and back. As such, it was analogous to the provision of general governmental
services, such as fire and police protection, and to the maintenance of public highways
and sidewalks. The establishment clause does not preclude the state from providing
ordinary service such as these; therefore, neither does it prohibit legislation providing "a
general program to help parents get their children, regardless of their religion, safely and
expeditiously to and from accredited schools."41 The establishment clause "requires the
state to be neutral in its relations with groups of religious believers and non-believers; it
does not require the state to be their adversary. State power is no more to be used so as to
handicap religions than it is to favor them.”42 By interpreting the establishment clause to
require “a wall of separation between church and state” prohibiting all state aid to
religion beyond the provision of ordinary governmental services, the Court thus opened
the door for subsequent challenges to laws providing public funding to religious schools
and to the Protestant moral instruction that was common in the public schools.

A. Public Aid to Religious Schools
Everson set the Court on what has proven to be a meandering course
distinguishing between constitutional and unconstitutional public assistance to religious
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schools. The cases include those: affirming a New York state law requiring local school
districts to lend textbooks without charge to students, including those attending religious
schools;43 prohibiting governmental support for teachers teaching secular subjects in
parochial schools;44 striking a New York law providing various forms of public
assistance to private schools in the state, most of which were religiously affiliated, and to
parents of children enrolled in private schools;45 allowing the loaning to religious schools
of secular textbooks purchased with public funds but disallowing the use of instructional
materials purchased with public money and also prohibiting the provision of auxiliary
services, such as counseling and speech and hearing therapy;46 forbidding public schools
from loaning instructional materials to parochial schools and disallowing the use of
public funds for field trip transportation for parochial school students but allowing the
use of state-funded standardized tests and scoring services and allowing state-employed
speech and hearing therapists, counselors, doctors, and nurses to examine parochial
schools students on school grounds;47 allowing state aid to religious schools to cover the
costs of state-mandated testing and record keeping;48 upholding the constitutionality of a
Minnesota law allowing parents to take a tax deduction for school tuition costs,
irrespective of whether their children attended public or private schools, including
parochial schools;49 prohibiting the use of state and federal aid to employ public school
teachers in parochial schools for the teaching of remedial, enrichment, and special
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education courses;50 finding no constitutional violation in allowing a college student to
use neutrally available state vocational rehabilitation assistance funds to study for the
ministry at a bible college;51 allowing a state-employed sign-language interpreter to assist
a deaf student enrolled in a Roman Catholic high school;52 finding that a public university
does not violate the establishment clause when it makes student activity funds available
to various student groups, including a student-run religious organization, on the basis of
neutral criteria;53 allowing state-employed teachers to offer instruction in remedial and
enrichment courses in parochial schools;54 upholding a federal law providing
instructional materials such as library books, media materials, and computers to religious
schools;55 and, upholding a state law providing tuition assistance to low-income students
enrolled in religious schools.56
While there is no virtually no philosophical discussion about the liberal political
tradition and the place of religion in it in any of these cases, one sees in these cases a shift
in the political principles emphasized, or at least a change in the way the Court
understands them. This alteration signals as well, it seems, an adjustment regarding the
philosophical assumptions upon which the decisions rest. From Everson until roughly
the mid-1980s, the Court emphasized the principle of “neutrality” (as between believers
and non-believers) and the notion that religion is purely a “private matter for the
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individual, for the family, and the institutions of private choice.”57 The main test
employed by the Court for evaluating a law’s neutrality was the so-called Lemon test; that
is, whether the law has a secular purpose, the primary effect of which is neither to
promote nor hinder religion, and which does not lead to an “excessive entanglement” of
religion and the state.58 Because in the religious schooling cases the Court normally
accepts that the laws at issue have a valid secular purpose, which generally is to assist the
secular education activities within such schools, the constitutionality of a given law
generally turned on whether it advanced or inhibited religion or whether it led to an
excessive entanglement between church and state. The Court’s understanding of
neutrality, moreover, was controlled by its commitment to restricting religion to the
private sphere. Consequently, it saw no violation of the neutrality principle in a
compulsory, value-shaping, government-run educational system in which it was, as we
will see in the next line of cases below, systematically removing all official religious
aspects from. The Court’s belief that religion has no proper public dimension thus led it
to establish a baseline for neutrality that was skewed away from religion from the outset.
In other words, the existence of a secular, governmental school system that all
taxpayer are required to support makes it hard to understand exactly how the state is
acting neutrally with regard to religion. For many parents the ability to transmit their
religious beliefs to their children is an important feature of liberty, and religious
schooling is an important means for doing so. Yet while such families are compelled to
support the public schools, the Court struck down as a violation of neutrality any effort
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by the state to aid religious schools that went beyond assistance that could be categorized
as the provision of basic governmental services.59 Other types of aid were viewed as
either advancing the religious mission of the school or requiring an excessive
entanglement of church and state to ensure that the aid was not used for religious
purposes. The assumption that religion is a private matter to be confined to the private
sphere thus blinded a majority of justices in these cases to the decidedly non-neutral
aspect of public schooling and led them to view most legislative efforts to provide public
assistance to religious schools as violating the neutrality principle.
In cases involving public aid to religious schools the last twenty years, however,
the Court has moved away from its privatization of religion commitment, which has led
to a new understanding of neutrality. In these cases—Mueller, Witters (involving a
religious college), Zobrest, Agostini, Mitchell, and Zelman—the Court seeks not to
confine religion to the private sphere but to ensure that the state does not directly promote
religion. That the state should not directly promote religion of course was an objective of
the earlier decisions too, but the privatization commitment of the majority of justices in
those cases led them to view almost all public assistance to religious schools as a
violation of the neutrality principle, as they understood it. The rejection of the
privatization commitment, on the other hand, has led to a modification of the Lemon test
and to an understanding of neutrality that does not regard the fact that public assistance
reaches a religious school as necessarily indicating that the state has aided religion. The
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Lemon test was explicitly modified in Agostini v. Felton.60 A law’s neutrality is now
judged by whether the challenged legislation has a secular purpose that neither advances
nor inhibits religion. Because it is, again, rare in the religious schooling context for a law
to be struck on the grounds that it lacks a secular purpose, the question of neutrality turns
mainly on whether a law advances or inhibits religion. The answer to this question no
longer depends, however, as it did earlier, on whether the aid secures to the school a basic
governmental service (previously permissible) or goes beyond this (previously
impermissible, on the grounds that it either promoted religion or led to an excessive
entanglement between church and state). Instead neutrality is now judged by whether the
challenged legislation is a government program providing benefits to a broad spectrum of
individuals who are defined without reference to religion and in which government aid
reaches religious schools only as a result of the independent choices of the recipients.61
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As Chief Justice Rehnquist, writing for the Court in Zelman in 2002 in the most recent
schooling case, stated:
where a government aid program is neutral with respect to religion, and
provides assistance directly to a broad class of citizens who, in turn, direct
government aid to religious schools wholly as a result of their own
genuine and independent private choice, the program is not readily subject
to challenge under the Establishment Clause62

Under this new understanding of neutrality, a law passes constitutional scrutiny if it
provides aid on the basis of some non-religious criteria and does not attempt to steer
recipients toward religion. For example, the Ohio law at issue in Zelman was found not
to violate the establishment clause because 1) the eligibility criteria for the voucher
program was poverty and geography; that is, all financially needy students living within
the boundaries of the Cleveland school district are eligible to receive tuition assistance;
and, 2) the money can be used at public schools in adjacent districts and at private
schools, religious and non-religious, within the Cleveland district.63 The law thus does
not define recipients on the basis of religion and it provides them with meaningful choice
as between religious and secular alternatives.
As is evident, under this newer meaning of neutrality the Court does not object to
the fact that public assistance promotes the religious mission of a school. On the Court’s
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reasoning, such promotion is not attributable to the state, as the private choice of
individual recipients is the reason public aid gets directed to a religious school. As the
majority opinion in Zelman noted, the “incidental advancement of a religious mission, or
the perceived endorsement of a religious message, is reasonably attributed to the
individual recipient, not to the government, whose role ends with the disbursement of
benefits.”64 On this understanding of neutrality there is no effort to restrict religion to the
private sphere. Neutrality requires only that the state neither define recipients of aid on
the basis of religion nor attempt to steer individuals toward the religious alternative. That
some individuals go on to use neutrally available public assistance in a way that promotes
religion means only that the individuals themselves, not the state, have favored religion.

B. Religion in the Public Schools
Before Everson the Supreme Court had been largely silent as to the operation of
the public schools.65 Following Everson the Court used the establishment clause to
invalidate a variety of state and local educational practices that it judged as promoting
religion in the public schools. These practices included "release time" programs whereby
teachers from all religious groups choosing to participate, and who were paid by the
groups they represented, were permitted to offer religious instruction in the public
schools one hour per week;66 state-sponsored nondenominational prayer in which student
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participation was voluntary;67 commencing the school day with Bible reading and
recitation of the Lord's Prayer;68 a state law prohibiting the teaching of evolutionary
theory in public schools and universities;69 posting of the Ten Commandments in school
rooms; 70 commencing the school day with a moment of silence for either meditation or
voluntary prayer;71 a state law prohibiting the teaching of evolutionary theory in public
schools and universities unless creation science was also taught;72 clergy-led prayers at
graduation ceremonies;73 and, student-led prayers at school sporting events.74
Unlike the public assistance cases, one does not find in the public school cases any
change over time in the Court’s approach to them. The principle that the state must
remain neutral with respect to religion is of course the benchmark employed for judging
the constitutionality of the programs at issue in the various cases. And the Court
understands neutrality in the older sense of the term, as in the public aid cases through
about the mid-1980s, and this understanding has remained constant over the years. It
make sense of course that that the understanding has remained unchanged, for the
context—internal activities of government institutions—does not lend itself to the
“circuit-breaker” analysis now employed in the aid cases. That is, religious activities in
the public schools inescapably involve the state in the promotion of religion. There is no
free and independent choice of parents, as is possible in the aid context, to sever the link
between the state and the promotion of religion. The rationale that thus runs through
these cases is that each of the practices at issue lacks a secular purpose and involves the
67
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state, through the public schools, in the promotion of religion in violation of the neutrality
principle and, hence, the establishment clause.75
Having briefly summarized the Court’s establishment clause jurisprudence in the
schooling context, let us now examine more closely the reasoning in these cases to see if
we can discern any particular understanding of the liberal political tradition.

III. The Understanding of Liberalism in the Schooling Cases
As I noted earlier, one does not find in any of the church-state cases much of a
discussion about the meaning of the liberal political tradition and the place of religion in
it. What one does find, however, is an intermittent commitment, especially in the Court’s
establishment clause jurisprudence through the 1960s and 1970s, to the secularization of
the public sphere. This is a well-chronicled phenomenon,76 and as George Dent explains
somewhat hyperbolically, is one in which the “Court believed religious people are
irrational, try to suppress the truth, and need to be enlightened with secular truth”; thus
“secular justices . . . sought to banish religion from public life and exile it to the private
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sphere.”77 And Michael McConnell describes “two models of religious citizenship” in
our public philosophies, including the Supreme Court’s religion jurisprudence.78 On the
one hand, the Court has sought to establish a secular public sphere in which “laws are
based on secular premises, government programs and activities are strictly secular in
nature, and religion is deemed to be irrelevant to determination of the citizens’ civil
obligations[,]” the effect of which is to require “all citizens to put aside their sectarian
loyalties and convictions in their capacities as citizen, but to allow everyone complete
freedom to practice religion in private.”79 Yet on the other hand the Court has sometimes
evinced a commitment to “religious pluralism” that allows “people of all religious
persuasions to be citizens of the commonwealth with the least possible violence to their
religious convictions.”80
Having said this, one finds at least hints of the two concepts of liberalism in the
Court’s religion and schooling establishment clause jurisprudence. The existence of
intimations, however, does not establish either that the privatization of religion thesis is
rooted in autonomy-centered liberalism or that the friendlier view of religion that has
emerged in the neutral aid cases over the last two decades stems from diversity-centered
liberalism. As unreflective philosophically as the Court is, it is possible that both the
privatization of religion commitment and the more open view of religion derive from
nothing more rich or comprehensive than either simple skepticism concerning, or support
for, religion. The aim of this portion of the essay is thus to see if we might draw out of
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the religion and schooling cases something more philosophically robust than first meets
the eye.

A. Public Aid to Religious Schools
The belief that religion is purely a private matter to be confined to the private
sphere, which was once the majority position on the Court but is no longer so,81 has
obvious parallels to autonomy-centered liberalism. According to Galston, autonomycentered liberals regard ways of life based on religion or tradition as inferior to a life of
autonomy or individuality. One sees a similar negative view towards religion, or at least
towards religion in the public sphere, in the reasons various justices have given for the
assertion that the establishment clause requires religion to be restricted to the private
sphere. In easily the most extended discussion of the privatization commitment in any
church-state case, the dissenting justices in Zelman, for example, regard the use of public
funds in religious schools as tyrannizing the minds of citizens,82 believe that religion
must be kept private in order to save it from its own corruption,83 and believe that
religion is hopelessly divisive and threatening to social stability.84
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The belief that religion should be confined to the private sphere purports to be
true to the original intent of the establishment clause, i.e., it is a claim that the
establishment clause was intended by the men who drafted and ratified it to bar religion
from the public sphere to protect rights of conscience, to protect the purity of religion,
and to protect the public sphere from religiously-motivated civic strife.85 These are not
inappropriate objects of concern but the claim that the establishment clause was intended
to restrict religion to the private sphere is patently false. One need only recall that when
ratified the First Amendment, as with all of the Bill of Rights, limited only Congress in
its actions, not state governments. And the states of course provided public support for
religion in a variety of ways, including established churches, religious tests for office, and
blasphemy laws.86 Whatever the original intent of the establishment clause, it clearly was
not to confine religion to the private sphere as it left unmolested all the ways in which the
states supported religion.87 Having noted this, I do not wish engage in a debate about the
original meaning of the establishment clause. Rather, my aim is to draw out the negative
view of religion that is suggested or implied in the three rationales of the privatization
claim.
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I have written at length on this previously88 and will not rehearse here the full
extent of my arguments, though several brief remarks are in order. First, it is difficult to
understand how rights of conscience are tyrannized by aid programs of the type that the
Court has routinely affirmed over the last two decades wherein individual aid recipients
channel money to schools of their choice, religious or secular.89 In other words, in the
context of an expansive regulatory state wherein government spends trillions of dollars
annually90 and intrudes into the lives of citizens in ways unimaginable to the founding
generation it is hard to see why we should view neutral aid funds that wind up in the
coffers of religious institutions as a result of the free and independent choices of aid
recipients as any more offensive to rights of conscience than any other governmental
spending to which citizens object. Neutral aid programs coerce no belief or action and
leave citizens to live according to their own best lights, believing or not believing what
they will about God, living according to the dictates of their consciences. The claim that
such programs violate rights of conscience then seems little more than a knee -jerk
reaction, a mantra duly recited, devoid of any meaningful analysis. In fact, the easy
equating of neutral aid programs of today with Patrick Henry’s A Bill Establishing a
Provision for Teachers of the Christian Religion indicates almost a profound lack of
curiosity about religious liberty. That is, as I noted above,91 Jefferson and Madison are
regarded by the privatization justices as authoritative on the meaning of the establishment
clause, and their writings from which the purported meaning of it is drawn are Jefferson’s
88
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A Bill for Establishing Religious Freedom and James Madison’sMemorial and
Remonstrance against Religious Assessments.92 The Memorial and Remonstrance of
course was written in opposition to Henry’s Bill, which would have created a property tax
to fund the teaching of Christianity. The controversy over Henry’s bill, which Madison is
credited with defeating, gave impetus to the passage into law of Jefferson’s Bill, which
had been drafted and proposed several years prior to the Henry controversy.93 However
much Henry’s proposal to explicitly benefit the Christian religion would have violated
the rights of conscience of citizens of Virginia, which it undoubtedly did, such a proposal
is miles apart from the neutral aid programs that permit—permit, not require—aid
recipients to direct their benefits to religious schools. Jefferson and Madison understood
their principles of religious liberty as enlarging the sphere of human liberty. But in the
context of a far-reaching regulatory state that “touch[es] the lives of its citizens in such
diverse ways and redirects their financial choices through programs of its own,”94 the
reflexive cry that religion must be confined to the private sphere in order to protect rights
of conscience demeans religion as an activity not worthy of serious inquiry.
Secondly, the claim that religion must be confined to the private sphere in order to
protect it from its own corruption, that is, to protect it from secularizing influences that
competition for public dollars inevitably brings, is deeply and unnecessarily paternalistic.
That religious institutions might relax their principles in order to qualify for public funds
is a real concern, and were I a member of a religious community contemplating applying
for public funds, I would be extremely wary of such an undertaking. But I see no reason
92
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why the religious themselves should not be permitted to judge for themselves the risks
and merits of participation in a neutral aid program, and if they are willing to accept the
terms and conditions of participation, why that decision should not be respected. What
evidence exists indicating that the faithful are incapable of safeguarding their faith? It
seems to me that the anti-corruption argument is premised on the notion that Supreme
Court justices care more about the integrity of the faith of religious believers and
communities than do the faithful themselves—a proposition that seems highly unlikely.
Equally troubling is that the anti-corruption rationale seems also to presuppose that
Supreme Court justices possessthe theological and constitutional authority to tell the
faithful how to understand their own faith. Whatever else we may say about the First
Amendment, surely it should deny governmental officials any such right.95
As for the third rationale of the privatization claim—thatreligion must be
confined to the private sphere in order to protect civic peace and stability—we may
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reasonably wonder just how socially and politically disruptive religion’s involvement in
the public sphere is. Those justices who argue that establishment clause requires religion
to be confined to the private sphere expend great energy worrying about the divisive
potential of religion while failing to notice religion’s long involvement in the public
sphere in this country, a connection that has produced no lasting social strife. In her
concurring opinion in Zelman, for example, Justice O’Connor points out that many
billions of public dollars annually wind up in the coffers of religious institutions through
state and federal tax policies, public health programs, childcare programs, and student
loan and subsidy programs.96 Most of the programs Justice O’Connor notes came into
existence during the New Deal and afterwards, yet one is hard-pressed to point to any
enduring religiously-motivated social disruptions caused by the participation of religion
in these various programs. This of course is not meant to deny that much evil has taken
place in name of religion throughout human history, including American history.97 I do
mean to question, however, how instructive such atrocities are for evaluating the divisive
potential of neutral aid programs. It seems to me that the real issue concerning the
participation of religious entities in neutral aid programs has been fundamentally
misunderstood by those justices who seek and have sought to confine religion to the
private sphere. Take Justice Souter, for example, who would deny religious schools the
right to participate in aid programs of the type at issue in Mitchell and Zelman because,
among other reasons, of the concern about religiously motivated political strife. The
96

Zelman, 536 U.S. at 665-668 (O’Connor, J., concurring). Justice O’Connor uses the information cited to
make a different point that I am making, namely, that the amount of public funds going to religious schools
participating in the voucher program at issue in Zelman paled in comparison to the amount of public dollar
already constitutionally permitted to flow to religious institutions.
97
See, e.g., Philip Hamburger, Separation of Church and State 191-478 (2002) (recounting fierce antiCatholicism surrounding schooling and other public policy debates from the mid nineteenth century into
the twentieth century); and John C. Jeffries, Jr. & James E. Ryan, A Political History of the Establishment
Clause, 100 Mich. L. Rev. 279, 297-318 (2001) (same focusing largely on the issue of schooling).

33

.

problem with this view is that the debate over the inclusion of religious institutions in
such program is not a religious debate; it is a political one. The debate is not about
religion or establishing religious truth or government taking sides in a religious debate.
Instead, it is a debate about political principles as regards the structure and financing of
the education of children in a free society.98 Only political values are implicated in the
debate over public aid to religious schools. It is a political debate carried on by ordinary
political means. The establishment of religious truth orreligious orthodoxy is not part of
the debate. What is sought is not the establishment of religious orthodoxy but an end to
the government’s monopolization of education funds. As Gerard Bradley argues, the
issue of public aid to religious schools “has never been agitated in a way distinguishable
from political conflict generally, and the Court has done nothing except assert, without a
scintilla of evidence, the contrary.”99 This of course does not deny that religion is in the
background of the debate, but in a religious society such as ours religion is in the
background of virtually every political issue. And yet does not the American experience
confirm that individuals and groups of different religions and of no religion are capable
of living together more or less peacefully?
One should not misconstrue me as advocating any particular boundary between
religion and the state, or of encouraging an uncritical, unqualified, or unlimited
involvement of religion in the public square, or as denying the possibility that religion
could come to jeopardize civic stability. As I noted above, human history, including
American history, to say nothing of the current decade, undeniably teaches otherwise.
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My point rather is to note that in the American context religion has always had some
involvement in the public sphere and yet on the whole our experience has been one
without enduring religious conflict. And this is especially true post-New Deal where, as I
noted above,100 billions of dollars have been routed through religious institutions without
generating worrisome social strife. Despite the fretfulness expressed by Justice Souter
and others who seek to confine religion to the private sphere, it is telling that they fail to
cite any examples oflasting religious conflict in this country beyond referencing the
divisiveness of the founding era state-supported churches and 17th century Europe.101 We
should note, too, that Justice Stevens cites religious conflict in “the Balkans, Northern
Ireland, and the Middle East” as evidence as to why religion must be confined to the
private sphere in this country.102 In other words, I take my point that America has been
largely free of enduring religiously-motivated political strife, especially as regards neutral
aid programs, to be conceded by the privatization justices’ failure to point to any
meaningful examples of it.
The belief that religion must be confined to the private sphere does not
necessarily indicate hostility to religion, though in the past some justices’ privatization
commitments were infused with views that bordered on, if not crossed the line into, antiCatholicism.103 It does suggest, however, that the privatization commitment prevents
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individuals who adhere to it from thinking about religion in the public sphere in any but
negative terms. That is, while the reasons given in support of the claim that the
establishment clause requires religion to be confined to the private sphere—to protect
rights of conscience, to safeguard religion from its own corruption, and to protect the
civic peace—are not inappropriate objects of concern, they are explored in such a
shallow, dogmatic way by the justices committed to the privatization of religion that this
conclusion seems foreordained from the outset, as an a priori negative judgment about
religion, rather than as the result of a careful, searching inquiry into how religious liberty
can be protected and promoted in the modern administrative state.
Another similarity between the privatization of religion jurisprudence and
autonomy-centered liberalism is that both give insufficient attention to the nation’s
religious diversity. Recall that Galston argues that autonomy- centered liberalism fails to
take diversity seriously,104 and that public policies promoting autonomy are harmful to
“individuals and groups who cannot conscientiously embrace the Enlightenment
impulse.”105 Hints of this same failure to seriously reflect upon the nation’s rich religious
diversity are present in the claim that the establishment clause requires religion to be
confined to the private sphere. Despite the nation’s religious diversity, the privatization
thesis insists that the only education worthy of public support is secular education. The
privatization of religion thus fails to take diversity seriously in two respects. First, as

purpose of such schools, the very reason for going to all the work and expense of
maintaining a dual school system. Their purpose is not so much to educate, but to
indoctrinate and train, not to teach Scripture truths and Americanism, but to make loyal
Roman Catholics. The children are regimented, and are told what to wear, what to do,
and what to think.
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between religion and secularism, it places the state on the side of secularism. What is
more, it discriminates against families who desire a religiously-oriented education for
their children by taxing them for education purposes but denying them any share of the
proceeds. Families who desire a religious education are thus compelled to pay for the
education of other children while at the same time paying twice, as it were, for a religious
education.
A critic might object that attention to diversity is precisely what motivates the
privatization of religion stance. That is, one might argue that the justices who hold to the
privatization view do so out of concern that to do otherwise would be to put the state’s
imprimatur of approval upon mainly one religion—Christianity—the religion of the
overwhelming majority of religious schools in America.106 The privatization of religion,
one might therefore argue, is an expression of respect for our nation’s religious diversity
in that no one religion receives favored treatment. In other words, the privatization of
religion treats all religions equally; it insists that none can receive public assistance. On
its face this is not an implausible argument. However, I am unaware of any justice
making this argument in a public assistance case. If this is the actual motivating force
behind the privatization view, moreover, what is one to make of the negative assessment
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of religion that generally accompanies the privatization commitment?107 Were respect
for religious diversity the motivation for the privatization of religion, surely that could be
articulated without the off-putting critique of religion that runs through the privatization
opinions.
Whereas a minority of justices continues to insist that religion be confined to the
private realm, the majority view that has emerged over the last two decades aims not to
limit religion but to ensure simply that the state does not directly promote religion.108
This position is obviously friendlier to religion than is the privatization stance. But these
opinions are no more philosophically reflective than are the privatization opinions. Still,
one sees in them a hint of a philosophical understanding that is akin to Galston’s
diversity-centered liberalism.
Specifically, it is the shift the majority effects with regard to the meaning of
neutrality that points to an understanding of liberalism that is more diversity oriented.
The Zelman decision makes clear, for example, that a law is neutral, and therefore
constitutional, as long as it neither defines aid recipients on the basis of religion nor
attempts to channel them toward religious alternatives. This is so even if a great majority
of beneficiaries actually choose the religious option. As Chief Justice Rehnquist wrote in
Zelman, “[t]he constitutionality of a neutral education aid program simply does not turn
on whether and why, in a particular area, at a particular time, most private schools are run
by religious organizations, or most recipients choose to use the aid at a religious
school.”109 On this view, religious schooling is an unexceptional alternative in a
pluralistic society; the choice for religious schooling is no more noteworthy than the
107
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choice for secular education. The justices holding this position are unmoved by the fact
that in a neutrally available program some or even many families will choose the
religious alternative. They seek neither to confine religion nor marginalize religious
belief, only to ensure that the state does not directly promote religion. From this
perspective, the Court’s proper oversight of religion is simply to ensure that public policy
does not favor religion, that it does not define recipients on the basis of religion or
attempt to channel them toward the religious alternative.
This comports with diversity-centered liberalism in the sense that it recognizes the
religiously diverse character of the United States and leaves families free to choose the
religious alternative or not, according to the dictates of their own beliefs. It recognizes,
too, that religious believers are citizens and taxpayers who have contributed to the
government’s education fund. Consequently, the diversity approach, if it may be called
that, does not regard the fact that public funds are used in religious schools as an instance
of the state favoring religion. Instead, it treats such programs as allowing the families of
religious school students simply to share in the pool of resources that they helped
establish. Public funding of religious schools serves the interest of diversity by
expanding the educational opportunities available to a diverse population. There is then
for these justices no meaningful objection to including religious schools in the publicly
funded alternatives parents and children have so long as religion is not favored.
The majority’s insistence that religion not be favored further suggests an
understanding of liberalism analogous to diversity- centered liberalism
. Were

a public

program to favor religion, it would fail to take diversity seriously in that it would fail to
acknowledge that many Americans do not profess any religious beliefs at all, or they
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profess religious beliefs different from those found in many religious schools. In other
words, the majority seems to recognize that while any reasonable conception of diversity
has to include religion, it cannot be limited to religion.

B. Religion in the Public Schools
The understanding of liberalism that seems to underlie the judgments in the public
school cases is less clear than it is in the public aid cases. One reason for this, I think, is
that unlike the jurisprudence in the aid cases, there has been no shift in the understanding
of neutrality in the public school cases. That is, in these cases the Court has been
consistent in insisting that religion be restricted to the private sphere. As Justice
Kennedy wrote for the Court in Lee v. Weisman, declaring unconstitutional clergy-led
graduation ceremony prayers, “[t]he design of the Constitution is that preservation and
transmission of religious beliefs and worship is a responsibility and a choice committed
to the private sphere.”110 That the jurisprudence of the public school cases has not
followed that of the aid cases is not surprising. For the context—the activities of the
public schools—of necessity does not allow for a reconceptualization of neutrality, at
least not along the lines of the public aid cases. Public schooling is not a neutrally
available public assistance program that leaves it to families to choose between secular
and religious alternatives. There is no intervening independent choice of families, as in
the public aid cases, that breaks the circuit, as it were, between the state and religion.111
Religious activities in the public schools inescapably involve the state in the promotion of
religion. Consequently, in this context the only alternative to the state’s promotion of
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religion is to insist that religion be limited to the private sphere.112 Perhaps the starkness
of alternatives in this context helps explain why in this line of cases one sees nothing of
the negative view of religion in the Court’s opinions as is found in the public aid cases.
That is, the simplicity of the choice before the Court in the public schooling cases—either
permit the state to promote religion or not—leads the Court to engage in little analysis
beyond stating the purported historical meaning of the establishment clause. In short, the
fact that the Court generally does not view the public school cases as difficult decisions
leads it to say little at all about religion. This contrasts with the aid cases, where in the
context of the modern regulatory state one might view the programs at issue as rather
unremarkable. This was of course Justice O’Connor’s point in her concurring opinion in
Zelman,113 where she cataloged the variety of ways that religion and the state mix in the
modern bureaucratic state, all without violating the establishment clause.114 In other
words, in the age of trillion dollar government budgets,115 the fact that a few education
spending program permit families to choose religious alternatives is not particularly
momentous, especially in light of the fact that to the extent that public monies end up in
religious institutions it is because of recipient choice rather than governmental direction.
Because neutral aid programs permitting religious choice are rather unexceptional
features of our administrative state, those justices who wish to restrict religion to the
private sphere are compelled to argue not simply that neutral aid programs are
112
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unconstitutional, but also that they are unwise policies—thatreligion threatens the rights
of others and is it itself endangered by the secular state when it seeks to move beyond the
private sphere. In the aid cases the privatization justices thus articulate lengthy,
substantive-like critiques of religion—policy judgments cloaked in legal arguments—
while saying nothing of substance about religion in the public school cases.
We might look to the dissenting opinions in the public school cases for some hint
as to the understanding of liberalism that informs the Court’s decisions in this line of
cases. Unfortunately, however, the opinions of the dissenting justices in these cases are
unhelpful in trying to draw out the philosophical assumptions of either the position for
excluding or for permitting official religions activities in the public schools. These
justices—among the current Court, Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justices Scalia and
Thomas, who would allow, for example, official prayers at graduation ceremonies and at
school sporting events—generally rest their arguments on history rather than any implicit
philosophical arguments.116
Further clouding the issue of just what understanding of liberalism animates the
public school cases is the fact that the cases excluding religion from the public schools
can be justified on the basis of diversity-centered liberalism, or at least a version of it.
That is, the state fails to take diversity seriously, to respect the beliefs of all citizens,
religious and nonreligious alike, when it places its weight behind one (usually) religion—
namely, Christianity. Respect for religious diversity, then, requires the state to abstain
from inculcating religious beliefs, even through the relatively mild measures that have
been declared unconstitutional. While the exclusion of religion from the public schools
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can be justified by a thin account of the diversity principle, none of the public school
cases appear to rest on this rationale. To be sure, there is the occasional mention of
diversity, as in Justice Brennan’s concurring opinion in Abington School District v.
Schempp, where he notes how much more religiously diverse the nation is now than at its
founding.117 Instead the main rationale for these cases is simply that the establishment
clause forbids the government’s involvement in religious activities. In any event,
attempting to justify the decisions on the basis of any robust notion of diversity would be
problematic in light of the compulsory, secular nature of the public schools.
Leaving aside the important question of whether public schooling itself rests upon
an understanding of liberalism that is autonomy-centered,118 to the extent that one sees
any notion of the Court’s understanding of liberalism in the public school cases, it is in its
claims about the purportedly different functions of public schooling and private schooling
and the dissimilar principles that are said to animate each. Justice Brennan states this
view well in his concurring opinion in Abington School District v. Schempp, where he
writes that “public schools serve a uniquely public function: the training of American
citizens in a atmosphere free of parochial, divisive, or separatist influences of any sort—
an atmosphere in which children may assimilate a heritage common to all American
groups and religions.”119 The Schempp decision prohibits public schools from beginning
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school days with Bible reading and a recitation of the Lord's Prayer, and Justice
Brennan’s point, in the quotation above, is that official religious exercises introduce
divisiveness into the schools that would otherwise be absent. This is not the place for a
comprehensive critique of Justice’s Brennan’s claim, but his insinuation that but for
religion public schooling would be free of “divisive influences” is not one that accords
with the history of public schooling. Stephen Arons, for example, in criticizing
government-run schooling, documents a wide array of contemporary disputes over the
moral and civic instruction in the public schools.120 Let us not forget too that the public
schools are a critical staging ground for what James Davison Hunter and others have
referred to as “culture wars.”121 Witness the ever more common conflicts over sex
education and multicultural and diversity education in the public schools.122 To be sure,
in a nation as religiously and morally diverse as ours, official religious exercises in the
public schools are indeed divisive, but it is not the case that the removal of such practices
has ended our divisions over public schooling.
Justice Brennan’s larger point, however, is that public schools are animated by
“democratic values” and “serve a uniquely public function”123 while “sectarian education
. . . offers values of its own.”124 That public function, of course, is to turn children from
diverse backgrounds into democratic or liberal citizens, or as Justice Brennan puts it, to
be the instrument of assimilation for “all American groups and religions.”125 Or as
Justice Brennan wrote for the Court elsewhere, “[p]ublic schools are “vitally important
120
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‘in the preparation of individuals for participation as citizens,’ and as vehicles for
‘inculcating fundamental values necessary to the maintenance of a democratic political
system.’”126 Justice Brennan of course is not making a novel claim about the
democratizing role of the public schools,127 so I want to focus here not on his claim about
the public schools but on his understanding of private schooling. In contrast to the
democratic values promoted in the public schools, religious schools, Justice Brennan
argues, “offer[] values of [their] own.”128 Undoubtedly religious schools do offer values,
i.e., religious values, not found in the public schools. Presumably this is the very reason
for their existence. But is it the case that simply because religion is part of the experience
of religious schooling that such schools serve no public function, that they do not also
inculcate “liberal” or “democratic” values such as tolerance and respect for the rights of
others and a willingness to participate in the nation’s political processes and civil society
more generally? Justice Brennan seems to presume that this is the case, as do many
liberal and democratic theorists who are critical of religious schooling.129 Indeed the very
labels used to distinguish government schools from and nongovernmental schools—
“public” vs. “private”— signifies this presumption. It is perhaps telling that advocates of
this claim do not so much argue that religious schools serve no public function as assert
it, as the example of Justice Brennan shows. To state the matter another way, it is
presumed thatas between schooling options, only government schools impart to rising
generations the civic values necessary to sustain democracy.130 Religious schools, on the
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other hand, are presumed simply to inculcate narrow, sectarian dogmas that contribute
little to the preservation of our democratic way of life. We might ask, however: what
evidence exists to demonstrate that children who attend religious schools do not grow up
to become tolerant, responsible, law-abiding citizens, who are respectful of the rights of
others, with the capacity for thinking critically about politics and other matters, who are
capable of providing for themselves, and who are burdensome neither to their families
nor to society at large—who do not, in other words, become good democratic citizens?
The question of the degree to which religious schools actually instill important civic
values in young people is a question that has only recently attracted the attention of
researchers. Because it is a question that needs to be studied over a long period of time,
no ultimate conclusion has yet been reached. However, the extant research runs against
the long-held presumption that public schoolsoutperform religious schools in inculcating
civic values.131 In other words, evidence is mounting that religious schools are no less
effective, and perhaps even are better at, teaching civic values such as tolerance and
civic-mindedness than are the public schools. Justice Brennan and others are thus correct
to note that religious schoolshave values of their own , i.e., religious values, but are
wrong to presume thatth at is all they have, that they do not contribute to the health and
maintenance of civil society.
One might argue, too, that religious schools, indeed all private schools, serve an
additional public function in easing the enrollment burden on the public school system.
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Take the 2000-2001 academic year as an example. The U.S. Department of Education’s
National Center for Education Statistics estimates that over five million students were
educated in private schools during 2000-2001.132 While the precise amount is difficult to
quantify, private schooling undoubtedly saves government—local, state, and national—
millions of dollars annually by lessening the need for additional tax monies that would
otherwise be needed for the public system to educate millions of more students.133 In this
regard, recall that one of the legislative motivations for the tuition reimbursement and tax
credit plans declared unconstitutional in Committee for Public Education & Religious
Liberty v Nyquist134 was the fear that “any ‘precipitous decline in the number of nonpublic school pupils would cause a massive increase in public school enrollment and
costs,’ an increase that would ‘aggravate an already serious fiscal crisis in public
education [in New York state]’ and would ‘seriously jeopardize quality education for all
children.’”135 Quite apart from the civic education function of private schools, then, such
schools would seem also to serve the public good by the benefit they provide by
alleviating public school enrollment burdens, and correspondent financial obligations.
This fact, along with the civic education accomplishments of private schools, thus call
into question the presumption that “private” schooling serves only narrow, sectarian
interests.
What then can be said about the understanding of liberalism underlying the public
school cases? For different reasons, the belief that the state should not promote religion
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is consistent with both autonomy-centered liberalism and diversity-centered liberalism.
Unlike the opinions in the public assistance cases, however, which appear to bear a closer
resemblance to Galston’s two concepts of liberalism, the similarities, if any, in the public
school cases are less apparent. As I suggested, perhaps the strongest similarity to
Galston’s taxonomy is the public school cases is the notion that public schooling rests
upon and serves broad, near-universal principles while religious schooling serves only
narrow, sectarian interests. Although this view appears to have a low regard for
diversity—the liberty interests of parents in raising and educating their children as they
generally see fit requires the state, per Pierce v. Society of Sisters,136 to tolerate religious
schooling, even as these schools serve only narrow religious interests—it does not
necessarily point in the direction of autonomy-centered liberalism. To be sure,
autonomy-centered liberals argue that that public schooling should be a vehicle for
educating children away from inherited religious beliefs toward notions of autonomous
self-direction,137 but the Supreme Court itself has not gone this far. This is not to ignore
the fact that Justice Stevens suggests that public schooling should be an instrument for
educating children away from inherited religious beliefs,138 but among Supreme Court
justices, he appears to be alone in this view.
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IV. Conclusion

The conflict within the liberal political tradition between the principles of
autonomy and diversity that Galston describes seems present, if sometimes only faintly,
in the Supreme Court’s judgments about the place of religion in public life as regards the
education of children. The main challenge of discerning just what understanding of
liberalism, if any, animates the Court’s establishment clause jurisprudence lies in the fact
that Supreme Court justices simply are not very reflective or philosophical in their
opinion-writing. Neither those justices who have sought and seek to secularize the public
sphere nor those justices who have resisted this goal betray much philosophicalinsight.
Even so, there seems to be more than a passing resemblance between autonomy-centered
liberalism and the opinions of those justices who believe religion should be restricted to
the private sphere. The similarity is most apparent in the public assistance cases, where
the privatization commitment is paired with a negative appraisal of religion. One finds
indications that autonomy-centered liberalism also underlies the public school decisions,
but the evidence here—the assumption that religious schooling serves no public function
or does not contribute to the public good—is less distinct than in the public assistance
cases.
That the contexts are different helps explain why autonomy-centered liberalism is
more evident in the public assistance cases than in the pubic schooling cases. As I noted,
the practices that have been declared unconstitutional in the public schooling cases
unavoidably involved the state in the promotion of religion. Consequently, little in the
way of explanation is given, or perhaps even needed, to conclude that the state should not
promote religion. This contrasts with the public assistance cases where neutrally
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available programs leave beneficiaries free to choose between secular and religious
alternatives, thereby severing the link between the state and religion. Still another
possibility as to why autonomy-centered liberalism is more pronounced in the public
assistance cases, even if not all that robust, is that the Court is sharply divided in these
cases, especially recently. As the privatization of religion position has become the
minority view, justices writing in this vein have been moved to write lengthy dissents
explaining just why religion should be limited to the private realm. In doing so, the
affinity to autonomy-centered liberalism has become more apparent.
Diversity-centered liberalism, on the other hand, is reflected—not perfectly or
fully but is suggested—in the conception of neutrality that now commands the support of
a slim majority of justices in the public assistance cases. A law is now considered neutral
if it neither defines recipients on the basis of religion nor attempts to channel them
toward the religious alternative. Under such a program, public money that ends up
supporting religion does so not because the government has acted to advance religion, but
because individual recipients prefer the religious alternative over the secular one. This
understanding of government neutrality evinces far more respect for our nation’s
religious diversity than does the belief that religion is to be confined to the private sphere.
It seems to me, moreover, that it is a better, more accurate understanding of neutrality.
The older understanding, associated with a commitment to secularizing the public sphere,
inexplicably holds, or even fails to recognize, that the establishment of a governmentowned, compulsory, secular educational system means that the state is anything but
neutral with respect to religion. Though the newer understanding of neutrality seems to
be genuinely neutral as between religion and non-religion, its application is limited to the
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public assistance cases. Public schooling simply is not a neutrally available public
program that leaves parents to choose between secular and religious alternatives.
A way to summarize the Court’s religion and schooling establishment clause
jurisprudence would be to note that from the beginning of the Court’s religion clause
jurisprudence in the middle of the twentieth century until roughly about the time of the
ascendancy of William Rehnquist to the chief justice position, the Court generally sought
to confine religion to the private sphere, or to secularize the public sphere. In these
opinions, autonomy-centered liberalism, or at least hints of it, is evident. As the makeup
of the Court has changed in recent decades, a jurisprudence more akin to diversitycentered liberalism has emerged, as least as measured by the neutral aid cases. Evidence
suggestive of this is the fact that the aim in recent aid cases is not to restrict religion to
the private sphere but to ensure simply that the state does not directly promote religion.
The differing views on religion’s place in society, and the appropriate posture of
the state vis-à-vis religion, that are found in the Court’s establishment clause
jurisprudence thus contains tensions similar, if sometimes only faintly, to those found in
the conflict between autonomy-centered liberalism and diversity-centered liberalism. In
other words, just as the conflict between autonomy-centered liberalism and diversitycentered liberalism is a debate about the meaning of the liberal political tradition and the
place of religion, so too is the constitutional debate over the meaning of the establishment
clause fundamentally a debate over the nature of the liberal political tradition itself.
Writing for the Court in Lemon v. Kurtzman, Chief Justice Burger observed that the Court
“could only dimly perceive the lines of demarcation” drawn by the establishment
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clause.139 However dim the Court’s perception of the just boundary between religion and
the state may be, its marking of the boundary, circuitous and winding as it has been,
parallels at least in outline form the conflict between autonomy-centered liberalism and
diversity-centered liberalism. The conflicts within the Supreme Court’s establishment
clause jurisprudence then seem also to be largely about the meaning of the liberal
political tradition and the place of religion in it.
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